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I
INTRODUCTION
This project initiates a conversation about patient negligence and trust in
the medical setting. It operates as a thought experiment, imagining tort law and
the physician–patient relationship through an alternative lens—one that is
inspired by the charge of this symposium1 as well as recent high-profile events
involving obvious fiduciary misdealings. The project examines the line at which
a physician’s impermissible conduct should become reasonably obvious to a
patient and therefore trigger a reasonable response. Absent a reasonable
response by patients, this project considers whether comparative negligence
attaches.
This project is narrow in scope, but the import and impact of the question it
poses and the possible answers it unpacks could prove quite significant as a
policy matter. We approach this project as an initial casting of the pebble in the
pond to anticipate possible effects: who might be harmed by and who would
benefit from such a proposal. Further, as a pragmatic matter, we consider how
the ripples created by the “pebble effect” impact the lives of those deemed most
vulnerable to abuse in the physician–patient relationship. The conversation
imagined for this project extends to policy debates on medical malpractice,
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1. Trina Jones has anointed a special project here: a challenge that junior and senior scholars
collaborate to build a discussion that incorporates their relevant areas of scholarship. This article grows
out of that charge, engaging tort law and medicine. It also incorporates Jones’s second goal that race
and class fit into its framework. Specifically, this project unpacks questions of trust and loyalty in the
context of medicine. Due to page and time constraints we initiate a conversation in this article that will
hopefully inspire additional comment. As a backdrop, this article provides a soft focus on trust in the
reproductive context. In that way, it builds on the discussion in Prosecuting The Womb, but rather than
urge reconsidering the value of fetal drug laws and explaining why states should be more wary about
prosecuting such cases especially in the absence of a more consistent approach (which treats harm
caused to babies by parental conduct more uniformly), this project assumes a different goal and
approach. This article considers the reasonableness of relying on trust in the fiduciary relationship. See
Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting The Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1657 (2008).
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patient accountability, health care reform, and the physician–patient relationship.
Animating this thought experiment are recent crises (outside of the medical
realm) involving financial breaches of the public trust, which highlight the need
for an engaged and searching inquiry into trust and loyalty. Prior scholarship
tackles aspects of trust,2 but most scholarship in this domain fails to scrutinize
the reasonableness of client or patient reliance on trust and loyalty. Instead,
trust is treated as an absolute entitlement that provides dividends to clients or
patients upon a breach.3 Due diligence, an aspect of loyalty, is treated as a value
fiduciaries owe their clients, rather than a reasonable step that clients owe
themselves.4 Unmistakably absent from scholarly debates about trust are any
discussions about whether it might be appropriate to impose an objective
reasonableness standard on clients in their pursuit and expectation of services.5
In this collaboration, we imagine and unpack a new theory of trust; one
which is animated by tort theory, and reads reasonableness and bi-directionality
into the trust relationship. Motivating our interest here is a gap in traditional
trust scholarship, which fails to capture a patient-focused standard of
reasonableness. Recent studies suggest that quality patient care should be the
focus of the physician–patient relationship. However, the notion that patients
owe physicians blind trust may obscure that objective.
Most scholarly inquiry related to trust and loyalty rarely if ever pursues
questions of complicity, contribution, and comparative fault of the client,
patient, or consumer. Absent from the public debate are examinations of the
meaning of trust and the risks of relying on loyalty in fiduciary relationships.
Specifically, rather than accept the strict-liability logic that patients, clients, and
consumers can always rely on their fiduciaries, perhaps it would be better to
examine whether trusting a fiduciary is intuitively correct. Is the security that
individuals feel in their assumption of a fiduciary’s loyalty rational or
reasonable?
Our inquiry into the reasonableness of relying on trust has considerable
relevance in areas outside the medical setting. Consider the following:
In the frostbiting closing weeks of 2008, home foreclosures, plummeting
stocks, and the narratives of defrauded investors dominated news headlines. At
year’s end, as snow blanketed the northeast, a cold reality set in among
sophisticated, highly educated investors. Sixty-five billion dollars from charities

2. See generally M. Gregg Bloche, Comment, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55
STAN. L. REV. 919 (2002); Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002); Claire
A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L.R. 1717 (2006); Christopher
R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515 (2004).
3. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 819–29 (1983) (discussing the law’s
protection of the fiduciary relationship through the imposition of nonreciprocal legal obligations).
4. See, e.g., id. at 825 (noting that corporate fiduciaries are liable to the corporation for failing to
exercise due diligence).
5. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT (1983).
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and individuals who had invested with Bernard Madoff cascaded into a virtual
abyss. The largest Ponzi scheme in U.S. history began to unravel. Madoff, the
financier at the center of the fraud, became a household name as charities and
investors bewailed the profundity of their losses. How Madoff would be
prosecuted and whether client losses could be recovered dominated news
reports. Befuddled reporters continued to interview distraught, defrauded
investors. How could such a betrayal be maintained over years—decades even?
Unlike the mortgage-crisis victims—individuals characterized as high-risk,
less-sophisticated, and less-educated borrowers, duped by lenders trained in the
art of persuasion—Madoff’s victims hailed from an entirely different cultural
and socioeconomic bracket. But are they so very different? Upon closer
examination, common threads link manipulated borrowers and defrauded
investors. In both cases, private losses became public problems. But, more
importantly for purposes of this article, both groups relied on relationships built
with their fiduciaries. Some of those relationships were rather short-lived, as in
the cases of mortgage borrowers. Others, such as Madoff’s mostly Jewish
clientele, seemingly relied on an affinity relationship as much as on his
reputation for steady returns over the years. The question that links the duped
investors with the mortgage fraud victims is how reasonable was their trust
either in Madoff or in the untested loyalty and commitment of mortgage
brokers?
Discussions about defrauded investors and duped consumers of balloon
mortgages might be enhanced by an exploration of the reasonableness of their
reliance. In other words, perhaps “reasonableness” should be introduced into
the discourse on fiduciary responsibility, much as it dominates torts and
criminal-law discourses. Opening such a discussion might encourage us all to
think about the subjective and objective tort dimensions of trust and loyalty.
An inattentive reading of this article might lead some to misconstrue its
thesis as victim blaming. However, victim blaming disserves its message and
import. This article seeks to affirm choice, empower patients, realign the
doctor–patient vertical hierarchy, and disrupt the implied assumption that
surrendering trust is a quid pro quo element of receiving quality health care.
The goal here is to ask deeply challenging questions. At the center of this
inquiry is whether patient negligence can exist, even when a patient has not
committed an affirmative wrong, but simply acted blindly. This redirection
might be better understood within the comparative framework of tort law,
where contributory and comparative negligence doctrines have long and, in
some cases, checkered pasts.
A few matters other than what might be viewed as victim blaming
complicate this article’s thesis or expose its weaknesses. First, this article
displaces or complicates notions of innocence by asking whether an innocent
patient can be legally at fault for personally negligent behavior. Second, some
scholars might argue that this article proposes an unnecessary complication to
or imposition on legal adjudication. Why not keep the legal (civil or criminal)
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adjudication of these matters simple? By continuing a strict-liability approach,
the argument goes, all liability is rightfully imposed on fiduciaries whose breach
of trust results in harm. As a corollary, it could be argued that transaction costs
are minimized or reduced when the law concerns itself solely with the primary
wrongdoer. Finally, whether the defrauded client or aggrieved patient can also
be a wrongdoer is a question that might be rejected intuitively on moral
grounds. 6
Assessing the appropriateness of applying negligence to patients requires
confronting an unmistakable power dynamic7 highlighted by information gaps
that reify the victim status of patients and an imbalance of expertise. A patient’s
disadvantage in the physician–patient relationship is intensified when a patient
lacks the capacity to properly investigate the fiduciary’s work product. As a
result, any exploration of patient culpability may seem deeply incongruous. Yet
motivating this article are lofty ideas that relate to reducing social harms,
protecting patients by requiring affirmative behaviors, bridging the gaps of
accountability, and distinguishing the capacities of some consumer “victims”
from others.
In this article, we attempt to take on a discrete aspect of such a
reasonableness inquiry. We consider how a dialogue about trust might be recast
with the application of reasonableness in the physician–patient relationship.
Part II provides a very brief background in tort law’s comparative negligence
regime. In part III, we provide an overview of breaches of medical trust in the
United States, locating contemporary reproductive monitoring in a historical
context. Part IV considers whether the goals of established trust discourse
properly and realistically align with contemporary problems. In part V, we
begin to articulate the appropriate ex post inquiries for determining whether a
patient acted reasonably in trusting the fiduciary. Here, we propose a test that
considers the patient’s competence, knowledge, prior experience, access to
information, and resources to investigate. This test, we argue, provides a more
nuanced approach for ascertaining the circumstances under which it might be
reasonable for a patient to rely on a fiduciary. Naturally, an ex post inquiry

6. Typically, “negligence” involves an obvious harm to a second or third party. Motivating the
call for justice in typical negligence cases, then, are the externalities created from the breach of care. In
the investor–broker context, most would not suggest that defrauded investors were negligent as a
matter of law. In such an inquiry, fault would presumably flow from broker to defrauded investor (x•y).
This article maintains the importance of keeping open the possibility of fault emanating from the client
although not necessarily manifesting against the broker, but rather the investor’s (client’s) interests
(y•). Equally, in more-extreme cases, it may be possible, although not nearly as often plausible, that
negligence may flow from investor to a third party (y•z). In the in utero cases discussed later in this
article, it is debatable whether there is an external third party harmed by the conduct of the patient.
The legal status of fetuses is deeply contested in tort law, and courts typically dismiss claims for in utero
injuries sustained by fetuses when no birth results. See Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905 (N.Y.
1969) (holding that a woman could not recover for wrongful death because her twins were delivered
stillborn).
7. But see Richard A. Epstein, The Erosion of Individual Autonomy in Medical Decisionmaking:
Of the FDA and IRBs, 96 GEO. L.J. 559 (2008).
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lacks the efficiency of an ex ante algorithm for determining patient or client
negligence; however, we leave open as an important empirical matter whether
deterrence is achieved by ex post deterrence measures (including reduced
judgments). Part VI concludes.
II
COMPARATIVE FAULT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Tort law operates as a form of ex post insurance. It provides aggrieved
(injured, defrauded, and otherwise harmed) individuals with access to courts to
redress their harm. Tort law provides a remedy, which is usually financial,
against wrong-doers for an individual’s suffering. Commonly, the language of
“making the plaintiff whole” is invoked to describe what tort law does. Others
view tort law as restoring an individual to her previous or “pre-tort” condition.
As an economic matter, rather than imposing (or spreading) the costs of an
injury on members of society, our legal system generally seeks to narrow
recovery and shift costs or impose penalties on the person committing the tort.8
Overall, we assume this dynamic lowers the costs of accidents because it cabins
the wrongdoing.9 This function within tort law, to provide recovery for the
injured and narrow costs to defendants, emanates from the doctrine’s core
principles.
A succinct view of tort law is that it facilitates compensation to aggrieved
parties, while promoting social order.10 At a glance, it removes the incentive for
vigilantism or violent redress of a physical or emotional harm. But, such a
narrow view of tort law overlooks its economic and broader social goals and
interests. Tort law disincentivizes irresponsible conduct by imposing financial
penalties on wrong-doers. Tort law illuminates defendants’ conduct as having
consequences that are beyond the individual plaintiff, and that spread to others
in similar situations. Its compensatory function serves not only to disincentivize
poor (reckless or negligent) behavior, but also operates as an incentive to
improve conduct, elevate industry standards, self regulate, and impose internal
checks. Moreover, tort law cannot focus exclusively on plaintiff’s harm because
doing so would distort the broader aims of tort law to minimize risks—even
those that the plaintiff could have avoided. This view of tort law takes into
account its moral foundations,11 its liability origins,12 its common law
8. Although industries spread costs of accidents among consumers in sometimes very indirect
ways, an examination of cost-sharing is beyond the scope of this specific project.
9. See William P. Kratkze, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of Government and
Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1105, 1127, (1996) (“[T]he
purpose of tort law . . . is to minimize the combined costs of accident prevention and expected accident
costs.”).
10. See, e.g., Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238, 238 (1944)
(“The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust . . . losses and to afford compensation for injuries
sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another.”).
11. See generally James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908).
12. See John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315
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foundations, and contemporary aspirations of tort law operating as a living
body of law.13
Tort law is based on the assumption that members of society owe a duty to
their fellow citizens to avoid engaging in behaviors that could cause injury to
others. To calibrate when a duty is owed, courts rely on a “reasonable person”
standard. This objective standard inquires how a reasonable person would act in
a like situation. The reasonable person framework is employed to calibrate both
the defendant’s culpability and the plaintiff’s fault for ignoring the risks
inherent in the activity.
Tort law doctrine uses the language of breach to describe when a person
fails to comply with or obey this expectation. Most commonly, students
associate the language of breach to negligence cases as the elements for that
cause of action directly engage the language and action of breach. However,
within the realm of intentional torts, we also expect individuals to comport with
a generally accepted social code of conduct and not breach a duty to fellow
citizens by resorting to fisticuffs, making threats that could place individuals in
imminent apprehension of harm, or disturbing property.
Tort law’s evolution in the twentieth century coincided with advancements
in medical technology (and mistakes), automobile and railroad industries
(crashes and mechanical failures), and industries using scientific advancements
that happened to be big polluters. But tort law’s evolution can also be traced to
an identification and acknowledgement of broader social conceptions of harm,
such as emotional distress, sexual assault, gender discrimination, and racial
discrimination.
The contemporary landscape of tort law, which we address in this project,
involves another evolution within tort law, and that is comparative negligence,14
which turns the court’s eye from the defendant’s conduct to that of the plaintiff.
Traditionally, courts dismissed plaintiffs’ claims that involved any culpability or
fault by the plaintiff.15 Defendants could use the plaintiff’s contributory
negligence as an affirmative defense. A plaintiff’s fault became a total bar to all

(1894).
13. Michele Goodwin, Expressive Minimalism and Fuzzy Signals: The Judiciary and The Role of
Law, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 19 (2009).
14. Comparative negligence is an attempt to equitably assign liability and balance fault between
the defendant and plaintiff. Comparative negligence acknowledges that victims make mistakes, take
risks, and, in many cases, assume the roles of willful although negligent actors. DAN B. DOBBS, THE
LAW OF TORTS 497–98 (2000). There are three approaches to the comparative negligence doctrine:
pure, modified fifty percent, and modified forty-nine percent. Each approach rejects the notion that “at
fault” plaintiffs must be barred from recovery. In all comparative negligence jurisdictions, findings of
fact must be made on two issues: the amount of plaintiff’s damages and the percentage of a plaintiff’s
fault. See id. at 505–06.
15. See Williams v. Delta Int’l Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Ala. 1993) (“After this
exhaustive study and these lengthy deliberations, the majority of the Court, for various reasons, has
decided that we should not abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence, which has been the law in
Alabama for approximately 162 years.”).
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recovery even when the fault was as low five percent.16 As a contemporary
matter, nearly all states have abandoned that rule for a more evolved and
arguably more equitable, less draconian, standard of comparative negligence.17
By moving away from contributory negligence, courts repositioned the last
clear chance doctrine.18 Traditionally, the less vigilant plaintiff who fails to act
with reasonable care would be barred from recovering if she had time to avoid
the harm but failed to act. This move offered plaintiffs an opportunity to
recover, even when they could have prevented the accident. A classic, relatable
example is the car collision involving an oblivious pedestrian who steps into
oncoming traffic without looking both ways. To reduce damages, a defendant is
permitted to offer comparative negligence as an affirmative defense.
Comparative negligence calibrates the percentage of a plaintiff’s fault, and
measures this against the damages she would otherwise be entitled to receive.
In other words, a plaintiff that is found to be twenty percent at fault will have
her total damages reduced by twenty percent.
This project adds an inquiry to comparative negligence given that in the
medical sphere, a patient’s lack of culpability is generally assumed. In general,
patients are presumed to act reasonably even when they might or should know
that uncommon risks may be associated with receiving care from a particular
physician (such as the physician who has a history of medical malpractice claims
being filed against him or her; the physician who acts abusively toward the
patient; the physician who refuses to answer questions). Indeed, patients are the
most sympathetic plaintiffs because of the inherent misalignment of power
relationships between doctors and their patients and the vulnerable status of the
ill when they seek medical treatments.
But the realm of treatments or menu of options that doctors offer patients
has also evolved and expanded. Not all medical treatments relate to illnesses, as
was the case a century prior. Indeed, increasingly elective, invasive, and nonessential surgical procedures are on the rise both in the reproductive realm and
in plastic surgery. This project proposes a more searching inquiry into patient
accountability and reasonableness. It moves away from assuming that by simply
being a patient, the reasonableness standard is satisfied.

16. Contributory negligence serves as a complete bar to plaintiff claims in tort cases.
“Contributory negligence was an affirmative defense . . . . [O]nce proved, the plaintiff’s causal
contributory negligence immunized the negligent defendant. The rule was extreme. The plaintiff who
was guilty of only slight or trivial negligence was barred, even if the defendant was guilty of quite
serious negligence . . . .” DOBBS, supra note 14, at 494.
17. Forty-six states now operate as comparative-negligence jurisdictions. Only Alabama, Maryland,
North Carolina, and Virginia continue to bar plaintiffs’ recovery for torts in which they too have been
at fault. Id. at 504.
18. See McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W. 2d. 52 (Tenn. 1992) (abandoning contributory negligence
as a complete bar to plaintiff’s recovery). Note that the last-clear-chance doctrine is not rendered
obsolete by comparative negligence (despite the court framing it as such). Rather, it could be argued
that the last-clear-chance doctrine is harmonized within the new framework. Thus if plaintiff could have
prevented an accident, but failed to do so, her relative degree of fault will be calculated by the courts.
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This project urges a rethinking of what transpires between physicians and
patients in an effort to reduce accidents and avoid harms. It scrutinizes whether
the language of trust in the physician–patient relationship distorts what really
transpires between these actors. We suggest other dynamics motivate patients’
passivity, compliance, or participation with physicians, including the specter of
the law as an ex post protector against harm. At the core of this project is the
question of reasonableness with regard to patient conduct. By offering patient
negligence as a concept to be studied, we do not suggest that a patient’s
vulnerable status should be ignored. To the contrary, we hope to inspire greater
patient independence (and empowerment) and a rethinking of the trust
relationship.
III
MEDICAL TRUST BREACHES IN THE CONTEXTS OF SEX, RACE, AND CLASS
Class, race, and sex figure significantly and thematically in medical care. The
strange history of race and class intersecting in U.S. medicine dates back to the
antebellum period with medical experiments on enslaved women.19 The power
of this unique legacy is well captured in more contemporary contexts too, such
as medical experimentation on vulnerable and often uninformed patients,
including illiterate men, children, and prisoners. The Institute of Medicine
Study in 2002 and the subsequent book, Unequal Treatment,20 provide
compelling evidence of contemporary discrimination in medicine. Indeed, the
authors document that the only category of treatment that African Americans
receive more often than their White counterparts are amputations, which the
former are three times more likely to receive.21
The history of modern medicine is replete with far more instances of
medical trust violations against specifically targeted groups than previously
acknowledged.22 Yet, only recently has the legacy of medical wrongs against
vulnerable populations been addressed in popular academic scholarship. In
particular, racial groups, especially African Americans, have been the unwitting
victims in medical schemes that involved grave robbing,23 skin and tissue
transplantation,24 clinical trials,25 and other therapies.26 Perhaps for this reason,
19. See infra A.
20. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, UNEQUAL TREATMENT:
CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y.
Smith & Alan R. Nelson eds., 2003).
21. Id. at 6.
22. See, e.g., HARRIET WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL
EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (2006).
23. MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 173
(2006).
24. See Michele Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law: Organ Taking, Racial
Profiling, & Distributive Justice, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 2 (2001) (discussing doctors who harvested
corneas from corpses without prior consent).
25. Holly Auer, Clinical Trials Seek More Minorities AH: Too Few Enrolling in Key Research that
Can Save Lives, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Apr. 25, 2005, at 1A (discussing minority
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contemporary scholars who investigate such issues are skeptical about new
therapies specifically targeted at African Americans.27
This section briefly addresses breaches of medical trust, illuminating stories
of race, class, and medical wrongdoing. Medical trust discourse is of unique
relevance to African Americans who count, as sufficient causes for alarm and
mistrust, eugenic-focused (sterilization) practices in the second half of the last
century,28 HIV drug research on vulnerable African American children in foster
care,29 recent cornea transplant scandals involving unwitting families and the
corpses of African American and Latino gun-violence victims,30 and welldocumented medical disparities. The section concludes by raising normative
questions that push at the theme of this article, namely, the reasonableness of
extending trust to medical professionals despite an often tormenting history of
medical wrongs (often with government complicity) against African Americans.
At the core of this inquiry are several questions. When African Americans
appear to give consent or passively participate in medical decisions with
physicians is this, in fact, trust? Or is it simply the perceived lack of options?
Does trust attach at the same time that a patient accepts medical care? If trust
does attach at the time that medical treatment begins, does this expose

participation in clinical trials); Ta-Nehisi Paul Coates, Suspicious Minds; The FDA Has Approved a
Drug Specifically for Black Americans. But that Doesn't Mean They'll Buy It, TIME, July 4, 2005, at 36
(discussing briefly the Tuskegee experiments).
26. See, e.g., George T. H. Ellison et al., Race, Pharmaceuticals, and Medical Technology: Flaws in
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Rationale for Supporting the Development and Approval of
BiDil as a Treatment for Heart Failure Only in Black Patients, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 449 (2008)
(discussing FDA procedures for approving race-based clinical trials); Jonathan Kahn, From Disparity to
Difference: How Race-Specific Medicines May Undermine Policies to Address Inequalities in Health
Care, 15 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 105 (2005) (raising concerns regarding the use of racial categories in
medical research); Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes “Ethnic”: Law, Commerce, and the
Production of Racial Categories in Medicine, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2004)
(discussing implications of using race as a research category).
27. See, e.g., Rene Bowser, Race as a Proxy for Drug Response: The Dangers and Challenges of
Ethnic Drugs, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1111 (2004) (suggesting that racial targeting in drug research may
harm African Americans); Ruqaiijah Yearby, Good Enough to Use for Research, but Not Good
Enough to Benefit From the Results of that Research: Are the Clinical HIV Trials in Africa Unjust?, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1127 (2004) (questioning the fairness of HIV drug trials conducted in Africa for drugs
that will never be sold in Africa). To be clear, the African American experience only illumes further the
Native American experience with radiation studies, or the use of mentally disabled persons in other
government-sponsored medical research projects. Harriet Washington and Dorothy Roberts stand out
amongst the field of scholars working vigorously to excavate and archive this record, placing it in a
proper historical context.
28. See infra III.C.
29. Elizabeth Dwoskin, The AIDS-Babies-as-Guinea-Pigs Story Is Finally Over. Right?, THE
VILLAGE VOICE, April 1, 2009 ( “The majority of the 25 children who died during the trials were
extremely sick with full-blown AIDS when they began the testing, which has led the researchers to
believe it was unlikely that they died due to the medications. But they don’t know for certain. Without
medical records, [investigators] say[], it is also impossible to know what the actual effects of the drugs
were on any of the children or how much they suffered.”).
30. An even more recent example of such collusion is recent cornea-transplant scandals involving
unwitting families and the corpses of African American and Latino gun-violence victims. See Ralph
Frammolino, Harvest of Corneas at Morgue Questioned, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at A1.
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physicians to any additional liability or professional censure? Are there any
lessons learned from the legal profession and the well developed literature on
the professional ethics and responsibilities of lawyers? The answers, which we
discuss in parts IV and V, relate to choice, information, and options.
A. Medical Trust and Government-Sponsored Medicine: An Antebellum Story
“Black bodies often found their way to dissecting tables, operating amphitheaters,
31
classroom or bedside demonstrations, and experimental facilities.”

Slaves were involuntary subjects of early American experimentation.32 The
Medical College of the State of South Carolina, “like other Southern medical
schools, used live Africans extensively in medical demonstrations, and dead
ones for dissection.”33 Doctors, through their use of female slaves as research
fodder, developed gynecological advances, such as abdominal surgeries, the
speculum, cesarean surgeries, and others that are still employed today. Medical
accomplishments born on the bodies of enslaved Black women include Ephraim
McDowell’s successful removal of ovaries34 and Francois Marie Prevost’s
perfected cesarean section operations. 35 Perhaps the most notorious example is
James Marion Sims’ experiments on enslaved women that earned him the
distinction, “Father of Modern Gynecology.”36
In his autobiography, The Story of My Life, Sims speaks passionately about
experimenting on his female slaves year-round.37 He preferred to perform
surgeries on enslaved women without anesthesia, although postoperatively, he
provided them with opium.38 Dr. Sims wrote that Blacks endured pain far better
than Whites,39 basing this scurrilous medical assertion on the numerous medical
experiments and gynecological surgeries he personally performed on his two
special women slaves, Lucy and Anarcha.40 Anarcha suffered through thirteen
operations to correct her vesicovaginal fistula, a condition likely caused by her
enslavement and the withholding of nutritious foods. Sims became famous for
mastering the repair of vesicovaginal fistula.41 In his own words —
I was always anxious to see the result of all experiments; but this was attended with
such marked symptoms of improvement, in every way, that I was more anxious now
than ever. When the week rolled around—it seemed to me that the time would never
come for the removal of the sutures—Anarcha was removed from the bed and carried
to the operation-table. With a palpitating heart and an anxious mind, I turned her on

31. Todd L. Savitt, The Use of Blacks for Medical Experimentation and Demonstration in the Old
South, 48 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 331, 331 (1982).
32. See Martia Graham Goodson, Enslaved Africans and Doctors in South Carolina, 95 J. NAT’L
MED. ASS’N, 225, 226 (2003) (describing the practice of “slave medicine”).
33. Id. at 226.
34. WASHINGTON, supra note 22, at 70.
35. Id.
36. Goodson, supra note 32, at 229.
37. See, e.g., J. MARION SIMS, THE STORY OF MY LIFE (1884).
38. WASHINGTON, supra note 22, at 66.
39. Id. at 65.
40. Id. at 63–65.
41. Id. at 66.
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her side, introduced the speculum, and there lay the suture apparatus just exactly as I
had placed it . . . . I had made . . . one of the most important discoveries of the
42
age . . . .

Primum non nocere, “first do no harm,” remains the ethical guidepost for all
physicians and surely Sims was not ignorant of this medical tenet. However, he
clearly did not view his research subjects as “patients” or as individuals to
whom he owed a moral duty or ethical obligation. Neither the law nor his
cohorts disabused Sims of his lower regard for his African American research
subjects. The law treated slaves as chattel for legal and social purposes, allowing
Sims to do as he pleased with them. And although he described his experiments
with extreme candor, precision, and passion, leaving very little room for doubt
about the abuse conducted with his knife and scalpel, he faced no critique from
his peers, protégés, and bioethicists. This speaks largely to the status of his
research subjects and less to the notion that his experiments were bioethically
ambiguous. In fact, Sims’ status was elevated rather than diminished by his
medical conduct, likely because the medical benefits derived from his
unrestrained research benefited wealthy, elite women.
Medical experiments on slaves43 mark the beginning of a troubling era of
scientific research and medicine involving African Americans. Complicating
that period was the absence of a legal remedy for slaves used as research
subjects. Their compromised legal status prevented them from bringing claims
in battery and precluded criminal actions on their behalf. Furthermore, research
protocols on which tort claims might have been based were decades from being
enacted.44 Finally, as slaves, they could not avoid medical demands made on
their bodies without risking further harm.
B. Medical Trust and Government-Sponsored Medicine: A Deadly Syphilis
Story
Medical betrayal plays out in the minds of many African Americans as more
than episodic. It is viewed as part of a systemic pattern of abuse that continued
into the twentieth century, punctuated by what has been called “The Tuskegee

42. SIMS, supra note 37, at 245–46.
43. See id. (describing the frequent use of Blacks for surgical tests); see also, KATHERINE
OLUKEMI BANKOLE, SLAVERY AND MEDICINE: ENSLAVEMENT AND MEDICAL PRACTICES IN
ANTEBELLUM LOUISIANA (1998) (discussing the unethical medical treatment Blacks received in
Louisiana when compared to Whites); Savitt, supra note 31, at 331 (noting Black bodies were often
used in experiments and dissections); Katherine Olukemi Bankole, A Critical Inquiry of Enslaved
African Females and the Antebellum Hospital Experience, 31 J. BLACK STUD. 517 (2001) (describing the
treatment of slaves at the Touro Infirmary).
44. From the infamous prosecution and subsequent verdict against Nazi doctors, later known as
the “Nuremburg Trial,” emerged a new standard of medical ethics known as the Nuremburg Code.
Chief among the ten points outlined in the Code are informed consent, avoiding unnecessary physical
and mental suffering, and the liberty of medical subjects to end the experiment at anytime. See TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW NO. 10 181–82 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949).
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Study.” The notorious syphilis study sponsored by the U.S. Public Health
Service (PHS) and carried out over a period of forty years by government
doctors not only epitomizes research betrayal, but also standard medical care
for African Americans.45 The infamous syphilis study was conducted on roughly
400 Black men in the late stages of syphilis from 1932 until 1972.46 Researchers
purposefully targeted these uneducated, mostly illiterate men, the majority of
whom labored as sharecroppers in one of the poorest rural counties in
Alabama.47 The men suffered from tertiary syphilis, which can result in
blindness, tumors, heart disease, insanity, paralysis, and ultimately death.48
However, researchers purposefully avoided telling the men about the disease or
how it destroys the body.49 Instead, most were simply told that they tested
positive for “bad blood.”50
The purpose of the study was to collect data on the corpses of men ravaged
by syphilis.51 Since research was intended to truly begin at the autopsies,52 these
unwitting study participants were never informed when a relatively inexpensive
cure became available.53 They were meant to die during the period of
observation. The PHS researchers attempted to justify their study and conduct,
explaining the pressing social need to document and confirm that White bodies
and Black bodies respond differently to diseases and even to medical
treatments.54
The Tuskegee Study is thought to be the longest non-therapeutic medical
study on human beings in the world.55 By 1997, when President Clinton
apologized for the government’s complicity in conducting the study, only eight
survivors remained.56 Their fellow research subjects eventually died from
syphilis or syphilis-related diseases.57 The collateral toll extended to their
families as well: forty wives were infected and at least nineteen children of the
participants were born with congenital birth defects resulting from syphilis.58

45. See Savitt, supra note 31, at 331 (noting that doctors used Blacks in medical demonstrations
and dissections). Savitt writes, “Further investigation into this subject indicates that southern White
medical educators and researchers relied greatly on the availability of Negro patients for various
purposes.” Id. at 331.
46. Jay Katz, The Consent Principle of the Nuremberg Code: Its Significance Then and Now, in
THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
230 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992); WASHINGTON, supra note 22, at 163.
47. WASHINGTON, supra note 22, at 156, 161–66.
48. Id. at 159.
49. Id. at 161–66.
50. Id. at 162.
51. Id. at 164–66.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 165–68.
54. See, e.g., id. at 37.
55. Id. at 169–70.
56. Id. at 184.
57. Id. at 168.
58. Id. at 166.

GOODWIN RICHARDSON

Fall 2009]

5/1/2010 1:16:55 PM

PATIENT NEGLIGENCE

235

Coercion, fear, and social manipulation were the modus operandi for the
researchers who collected and retained the men in the Tuskegee Study. In fact,
the participants were promised free medical care and coerced through
communications that warned of their “last chance” for free medical care.59 The
medical care provided included painful spinal taps and aspirin camouflaged in
pink pills, described as “special pills,” to the illiterate farmers.60
It was not the experiment alone that makes the syphilis study emblematic
of medical betrayal. The Tuskegee Study survives in the memories of
bioethicists and African Americans not only because the victims were coerced
by doctors in their unfettered pursuit of syphilis-ridden corpses, but also
because the experiment continued in the wake of international criticism of Nazi
experimentation. Indeed, government doctors and lawyers condemned Nazi
doctors for engaging in notorious medical experiments on concentration camp
victims. However, the federally-funded syphilis study continued through liberal
and conservative presidential administrations, transitions in Congress, the
drafting of the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki, and the US
adoption of the Code of Federal Regulations. The study continued even after
the discovery of penicillin, the gold-standard treatment, which cures syphilis.61
According to former President Clinton, “The United States government did
something that was wrong—deeply, profoundly, morally wrong. It was an
outrage to our commitment to integrity and equality for all our citizens . . . .”62
He remorsefully offered, “To our African American citizens, I am sorry that
your federal government orchestrated a study so clearly racist.”63 Some African
Americans remain leery of government-sponsored or related programs
involving the body years after the infamous syphilis study.64

59. Id. at 163.
60. FRED D. GRAY, THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY: THE REAL STORY AND BEYOND 53, 59
(1998); JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT 127–31 (1981).
61. Id. at 165–68.
62. Id. 13.
63. WASHINGTON, supra note 22, at 184.
64. In testifying before a congressional subcommittee, Dr. Benjamin Payton, then-President of
Tuskegee University, urged lawmakers to understand why “African Americans exhibit a
disproportionately large amount of cynicism and lack of confidence in the U.S. health and research
establishment. Some studies link that mistrust to a long history of medical abuse extending back as far
as slavery. Others assert a more recent and direct relationship to what has come to be called ‘The
Tuskegee Experiment’ that was conducted by the Public Health Service . . . on poor Black males in
Alabama.” Hearings Before the H. Appropriations Comm. Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education Subcomm., 105th Cong. (1998) (prepared testimony of Benjamin F. Payton).
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C. Medical Trust and Government-Sponsored Medicine: Eugenics—Silencing a
Poor White Race
Race, reproduction, and medicine cannot be strictly defined by, or confined
to, an African American narrative.65 The perimeters of reproductive trust are
bounded by the American tale of eugenics and the forced sterilization of
thousands of White boys, girls, men, and women who were deemed socially
unfit.66 Paul Lombardo, the preeminent scholar tracking this woeful legacy,
writes about government complicity in crafting statutes that permitted
compulsory sterilization in order to prevent states from being “swamped” by
the socially unfit.67 Lawyers and doctors helped implement and enforce eugenic
laws.
Indiana passed the first eugenics law in the nation68 and, by the time of the
infamous Supreme Court decision in Buck v. Bell69 approving the constitutional
legitimacy of compulsory sterilizations, dozens more states had followed
Indiana’s example.70 Compulsory sterilization laws targeted poor, homeless,
illiterate White citizens in states across the country, although the laws were
often couched in public-health terms—to eradicate epilepsy, mental

65. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down a state statute that forced
sterilization on felons); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (condoning forced sterilization on feebleminded Whites). African American women nonetheless figured prominently in the eugenics movement.
See Rebecca Sinderbrand, A Shameful Little Secret: North Carolina Confronts Its History of Forced
Sterilization, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 2005, at 33 (describing the psychological trauma and continuing
legal battle of African American women sterilized in North Carolina). For one victim, Sinderbrand
reports the following:
She soon learned that the operation had been performed by state order in North Carolina in
1968, when she was just 14, and had given birth to a baby after being raped. At the time, she’d
assumed doctors were just performing a routine post-birth procedure. The sterilizationconsent form had been signed by her neglectful father and her illiterate grandmother, who had
marked her assent with an X.
Id. at 33; see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY 59–76 (1997) (describing the birth
of the eugenics movement in America and its interest in Blacks). Thousands of African American
women were sterilized during the twentieth century. Many were considered feeble-minded or
degenerates to society. Post-slavery African American women’s once-exploited reproductive abilities
were of little value and rather a “social” threat. State-sponsored sterilizations occurred in more than
half of the United States long after the Nazi’s horrible regime of experimental medicine had been
exposed. Cf. Michele Goodwin, The Black Woman In The Attic: Law, Metaphor & Madness in Jane
Eyre, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 608 (1999) (noting Black women were targets of eugenic experiments in the
late 1800s).
66. See generally Goodwin, supra note 1.
67. Paul A. Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three Generations of ??? Are Enough?, 30
FLA. ST. U. L. REV.191, 216 (2003).
68. STEPHEN TROMBLEY, THE RIGHT TO REPRODUCE: A HISTORY OF COERCIVE
STERILIZATION 51 (1988).
69. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
70. A complete list of sterilization laws in each state can be found in THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR
FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUB. NO. 7416001, FAMILY PLANNING, CONTRACEPTION, AND VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
LAWS AND POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES, EACH STATE AND JURISDICTION (1971), cited in
Stephanie Hyatt, A Shared History of Shame: Sweden’s Four-Decade Policy of Forced Sterilization and
the Eugenics Movement in the United States, 8 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 475, 490 n.98 (1998).
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retardation, alcoholism, and criminality. Eugenicists erroneously believed that
poverty, criminality, and homelessness were genetically inscribed.
The Buck v. Bell decision legitimized state suppression of reproductive
freedom for poor Whites. Carrie Buck, a poor White teenager and the
petitioner at the center of the case, had been raped.71 According to Virginia
state law, Buck qualified for compulsory sterilization because she was declared
“feeble-minded” by doctors at the state facility where she, her mother, and
other poor, illiterate Whites, were incarcerated.72 The Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia explained that forced sterilization of minors and others did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, distinguishing it from “such bodily
punishments as involve torture and are inhumane and barbarous.”73
According to Justice Holmes in a nearly unanimous opinion (Butler
dissenting), it would be odd if the state of Virginia could not impose upon those
“who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not
felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with
incompetence.”74 Holmes expounded, “It is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind . . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”75 The Justices found
that the regulations that promoted public health and safety, such as vaccination
laws, provided the precedent and model for sterilization laws.76
The compulsory sterilization laws of the United States would later serve as
the model for Nazi eugenics laws.77 At the Nuremburg Trials years later, Nazi
doctors used as their defense that they were only following the practices
initiated in the United States decades prior.78 Their observations were offensive,
but true.
D. Medical Trust and Government-Sponsored Medicine: A Contemporary
Story?
“The irony is that anyone who knows anything about maternal care in prisons would
79
never send a pregnant woman there to protect the fetus.”

Sex, race, and class continue to play a defining role in reproductive politics
in the United States. Nowhere is that observation better captured than in Dr.
71. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 79.
72. Buck, 274 U.S. at 205.
73. Buck v. Bell, 130 S.E. 516, 519 (Va. 1925), aff’d, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
74. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
75. Id.
76. Id. (“The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the
Fallopian tubes.”) (citing Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
77. WOLFGANG WEYERS, M.D., THE ABUSE OF MAN: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF DUBIOUS
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 242 (2003).
78. Id. at 349–50.
79. Jean Reith Schroedel & Paul Peretz, A Gender Analysis of Policy Formation: The Case of Fetal
Abuse, 19 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 335, 350 (1994).
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Marion Sims’ home state, South Carolina, which became the first to prosecute
drug-addicted women by relying on medical evidence gathered by doctors and
nurses at the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) and voluntarily
submitted to police and prosecutors.80 South Carolina led the nation with the
creation of fetal drug laws (FDLs) used to prosecute drug-addicted women
essentially for becoming pregnant.81
The pregnant women sought, and were encouraged to receive, prenatal
services through a public-service-announcement campaign.82 Unbeknownst to
the patients, the program focused on prosecuting women who used drugs during
pregnancy.83 Nurses and doctors at MUSC agreed to provide prosecutors with
evidence of their patients’ drug use by releasing the results of urine-sample tests
to law enforcement.84
Among the dozens of women fighting for their freedom after prenatal
exams was Paula Hale, a rape victim.85 Hale was never offered rape counseling
despite telling nurses at MUSC about the violence and abuse she suffered.
Subsequently, like many girls and women with similar histories, she turned to
illegal drugs.86 When Hale became pregnant as a result of that rape, she sought
treatment at the only hospital she knew to serve poor Black women like
herself—the MUSC. Again, “no one bothered to link her with an appropriate
drug treatment program or a trauma institute.”87 Instead, nurses and doctors
collected evidence of her drug use to turn over to police and prosecutors.88 Like
the twenty-eight other Black women snagged by the MUSC, Hale was “dragged
out of the hospital in chains and shackles.”89
These haunting episodes conjure images of slavery.90 Indeed, race seemed to
dominate every aspect of pregnant patients’ treatment at MUSC. With one
exception, all the women turned over to police for using illegal drugs during

80. See Goodwin, supra note 1, at 1677; Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (1991).
81. Roberts, supra note 80, at 1445–50.
82. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 1677.
83. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 71–72 (2001).
84. Id. at 71–72.
85. South Carolina Advocates for Pregnant Women & Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant Women,
South Carolina: First in the Nation for Arresting African-American Pregnant Women—Last in the
Nation for Funding Drug and Alcohol Treatment, Jan. 8, 2003, http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/
issues/briefingpaper.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) [hereinafter First in the Nation]. Such prosecutions
are epitomized as well by State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003), in which Regina McKnight was
convicted of homicide by child abuse after giving birth to a stillborn child who tested positive for
cocaine.
86. Id.; see also Renae D. Duncan et al., Childhood Physical Assault as a Risk Factor for PTSD,
Depression, and Substance Abuse: Findings from a National Survey, 66 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 437,
443 (1996) (showing victims of childhood assault were much more likely than nonvictims to take illegal
drugs).
87. First in the Nation, supra note 85.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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pregnancy were Black.91 Regarding the exception, however, hospital officials
made sure to note on her chart that the White patient “lives with her boyfriend
who is a Negro.”92 Thus, it would appear that the program was racially
motivated as well.93
What normative conclusions should emerge from the stories of medical
breaches of trust contained in this part? One conclusion is that vulnerable
populations, and particularly African Americans, should be cautious, and
justifiably so, about the type and quality of relationships they seek to develop
with the medical community and with government-supported medical
programs.94 Trust and loyalty are critical values and components of doctorpatient relationships. Yet, certain populations, like African Americans, have
good reason to be skeptical while other populations may not. Ironically,
however, these vulnerable populations who should be the most skeptical about
medical trust and loyalty are also often the same populations that lack the
opportunity and luxury of choice. This observation is critical to remember when
considering our proposal for an ex post test of reasonableness in part V.
IV
TRUST AND LOYALTY
“Without some minimal level of trust, patients would not seek care, submit to
95
treatment, disclose necessary information, or follow treatment recommendations.”

If institutions are perceived as untrustworthy, inefficient, and biased, they
will lose participant trust, loyalty, and confidence. This hypothesis holds true in
many contexts. However, as demonstrated by the Madoff scandal and the spate
of other recent financial debacles including Enron and Tyco, investors,
consumers, and sometimes government officials will ignore relevant
information at their peril.
This section analyzes whether the goals of established trust discourse
properly and realistically align with contemporary challenges. It asks whether
traditional trust discourses enable or burden patients. It resituates patients
according to their abilities and capabilities. Subpart A. provides a brief analysis
of the rationales for promoting a trust relationship between physicians and
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 1677.
94. A defining literature in the fields of critical race scholarship, ethnic studies, women’s studies, as
well as empirical studies, documents disparities and inequality in the treatment of African Americans.
See, e.g., Cara A. Fauci, Racism and Health Care in America: Legal Responses to Racial Disparities in
the Allocation of Kidneys, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 35 (2001) (asserting that African Americans
have “long been subjected to racism within the health care sector”); Sidney D. Watson, Race, Ethnicity
and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 204 (2001) (urging “adoption
of a systemic approach to reducing race-based treatment disparities that uses reporting systems and
financial incentives to produce structural change.”); Lindsey Tanner, Blacks’ Mental Care Lags that of
Whites, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at 33 (noting African Americans receive poorer medical care
than Whites in the area of mental illnesses).
95. Hall, supra note 2, at 478.
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patients. Subpart B. examines the rationality and reasonableness of patient trust
in light of inherent problems and conflicts within that relationship.
A. The Trust Relationship
Trust is the willingness of individuals to make themselves vulnerable to
others in the face of risks.96 Nowhere is this more prominently featured than in
medicine, where patients must rely on diagnoses, information, and treatment
decisions from their doctors. Within this context, patients expose themselves—
their medical histories, social histories, genetic information, and sexual pasts.
Most scholars who address trust in medical relationships contend that
patients benefit from a presumption of trust in their physicians.97 According to
Mark Hall, “trust is the core, defining characteristic of the doctor/patient
relationship, or, as is sometimes said, the “glue’ that holds the relationship
together and makes it possible.”98 According to Grant Morris, “trust is vitally
important for therapeutic purposes. With trust, the patient is willing to share
sensitive and confidential information, to be confident in the physician’s clinical
judgment, and to comply with the physician’s recommended treatment.”99
Frances Miller notes that patient trust is integral to the healing process, and that
patients who trust their physicians are more likely to follow their physicians’
recommendations.100
More explicitly, Robert Gatter, a leading medical-law scholar, urges that
patients’ trust in their physicians should be presumptive “because most patients
are not able to treat themselves or. . .direct the medical treatment they receive
from another.”101 His observation is grounded in the principle that “[t]rust is at

96. Hill, supra note 2, at 1724. Distrust involves a pessimistic attitude, a wariness, about the risk of
making oneself vulnerable to another. Hall, supra note 2, at 513.
97. See Kathy L. Cerminara, The Class Action Suit As A Method of Patient Empowerment in the
Managed Care Setting, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 17 (1998) (arguing that “[p]atients who trust their
caregivers often report more favorable treatment outcomes”); Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries
at the End of Life: Mediating End-of-Life Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Physician–patient
Relationships, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1091, 1099 (1999); Leon R. Kass, Neither for Love nor Money: Why
Doctors Must Not Kill, PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1989, at 25, 35 (implying that patients’ wholehearted
trust in physicians is ideal and that “[t]he patient’s trust in the doctor’s wholehearted devotion to the
patient’s best interests will be hard to sustain” if doctors assist with suicides); Peter D. Jacobson &
Michael T. Cahill, Apply Fiduciary Responsibilities in the Managed Care Context, 26 AM. J.L. & MED.
155, 157 (2000) (“The basic need for trust . . . is incontrovertible. Absent trust, managed care cannot
survive.”); Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical Research, 81
B.U. L. REV. 423, 426–27 (arguing that patient trust is a critical ingredient in the physician–patient
relationship); Starla Kay Roels, HIPAA and Patient Privacy: Tribal Policies as Added Means For
Addressing Indian Health Disparities, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2006) (explaining how HIPAA
regulations will foster trust and suggesting that when patients trust their doctors they will “more fully
participate in their own care”).
98. See Mark A. Hall, Trust, Law, and Medicine: Towards a Therapeutic Jurisprudence of Health
Care Delivery, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463 (2002).
99. See Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 313,
344 (2002).
100. Miller, supra note 97, at 426.
101. Gatter, supra note 97, at 1099.
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the ethical core of the physician–patient relationship and is essential to the
process of medical decision-making.”102 Gatter explains that the physician–
patient relationship requires this level of engagement. Gatter challenges the
proposition (espoused in this project) that the physician–patient relationship is
vertically positioned, with physicians at the top holding disproportionate power.
He argues that this portrayal inaccurately captures the relationship.103
This article takes a different approach, arguing for greater nuance in trust
discourse and articulating the inherent weaknesses in patients’ presuming trust
in physicians based on little more than an assumption that trust is warranted,
deserved, or necessary. In traditional trust discourse, the concern for patient
and physician fidelity is framed as a moral issue. In other words, patients should
trust their physicians because it is the right thing to do; physicians will better
serve patients whom they believe trust them; and patients should trust that
physicians are qualified to provide the treatments they offer. At some point, the
arguments become circular.
Missing is an alternative, but equally credible theory, to capture the patientphysician interaction. For example, is it a morally grounded trust that inspires
patients’ confidence in physicians or an understanding that physicians are
obligated by law to be licensed to practice medicine? Is trust grounded in the
understanding that, absent a physician’s due diligence and competence in a
medical procedure, a patient can turn to courts to vindicate their concerns?
Medical law scholars gravitate to the language of trust when other dynamics
offer equally and perhaps more plausible explanations of a patient’s perspective
in the medical suite. Traditional discourse explains that trust in physicians is
essential—and patients voluntarily surrender it—because physicians possess
“requisite medical knowledge and technical skill to effectively treat patients.”104
For some patients, trust is not what motivates their compliance with physicians.
Rather, a lack of alternatives or an emergency prompts their obedience. For
others, it may be intimidation or simple acquiescence because it seems to be the
right thing to do. And yet for others, reliance may be the dynamic that best
describes the interaction between patients and physicians, with trust adding
little value to the patients’ experience. In this way, some patients may perceive
themselves as contracting parties with physicians, rather than purveyors of trust.
Medical law scholarship portrays alternative values and dynamics (to trust)
in the physician patient relationship as either destructive or absent. But, neither
tort law nor medical ethics require physician competence because of patient
trust. Rather, that physicians are held to an elevated standard of competency,
skill, and professionalism has very little if anything to do with patient trust.
Instead, physician professionalism and the obligation to render care with
competence are grounded in physician ethics (i.e. fidelity to the profession) and

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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tort law. Thus, perhaps what patients really cling to is not medical trust, but the
strength of the law to deter physician negligence, and the specter of tort law
remedies to incentivize good behavior.
The goal of this project is not to suggest that trust has no place or value
within the physician–patient relationship.105 The most salient and persuasive
arguments for promoting the trust relationship between physicians and their
patients are grounded in the public health. As a public-health matter, society
has a vested interest in the health and well-being of its communities. The
inability to trust the quality, effectiveness, and confidentiality of care received
from medical professionals erodes confidence in the medical system. When
confidence in medical institutions and doctors erode, individuals are less likely
to seek treatment for medical ailments. If and when the sick seek treatment
from untrustworthy medical institutions, it is likely as a last resort, at a time
when their medical conditions may be incurable or infectious. On the other
hand, when trust is maximized and broadly realized, unhealthy people are likely
to seek medical care and reduce the spread of disease. Thus, trust can be seen as
promoting public health.
Patients come to their physicians at their most vulnerable. Their
vulnerability is demonstrated not only by their maladies but by the inability to
diagnose, treat, prescribe medications, and rehabilitate on their own. Ethicists
and scholars describe this vulnerability as creating a mental and physical state in
patients that generates the desire to trust physicians.106 To ease their suffering or
doubts about the quality of their care and treatment during periods of high
vulnerability, it may be less stressful for patients to rely blindly on the loyalty of
their physicians. Trust thus serves a medical function in that it likely reduces
stress, tension, worry, skepticism, and second–guessing in the physician–patient
relationship.
B. The Reasonableness of Relying on the Trust Relationship
Yet there are problems in relying on the trust relationship. As a result of
“blind trust,”107 patients may rely too much on doctors and fail to adequately
investigate treatment options. In essence, willful blindness disserves patient
interests as well as the legitimacy of the medical profession.
Patients generally believe that physicians have their best interests in mind as
part of the relationship.108 But whether such a perception emanates from
individual relationships, or is imposed by an external ethic, is debatable.
Whether trust in these relationships is always rational or reasonable might also
105. It is also important here to point out that we are not taking a prophylactic stand against trust.
Rather, what this article builds towards is the importance of demonstrable actions, information,
behaviors, and other indicators that would signal to a patient that trust has been earned.
106. Gatter, supra note 97, at 1099.
107. This article uses “blind-trust” to mean undeserved loyalty and commitment to a physician in
absence of demonstrable care, concern, commitment, expertise, medical history, and common goals.
108. Hall, supra note 2, at 474 (noting those who trust believe the trustee has their best interests at
heart).
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be debatable.109 For example, is it rational and reasonable to trust if a patient
fears that projecting a lack of trust will result in inferior care ?110 Is it rational
and to the patient’s benefit to blindly trust a doctor whose behavior or history
demonstrates negligence, abuse, or significant conflicts of interests? In both
instances, we think not.
Patients trust doctors because doing so is likely the easiest course of action
when an illness first develops. To some extent, patients trust doctors in much
the same way that they trust the police. That is to say, trust arises not from the
promise of a uniquely personal relationship, but rather by necessity, by what
patients perceive they should or must do.111 In an emergency, a burglarized home
owner knows to call the police, but might choose not to be picky about who
responds to the 911 call (or equally, might be afraid to articulate disagreement
or discontent with the officer’s treatment of the case because of relative
positions of power and authority). Similarly, patients may initially trust their
doctors because of their need for information, care and treatment, even when
they have no say in choosing the physician who treats them.
But, continuing to trust is not necessarily rational. Trust can cause patients
to ignore signals relevant to evaluating whether a positive, effective relationship
can develop with her medical professional. Signs that would certainly be
relevant in other interpersonal contexts may be ignored, such as a physician’s
dismissive behavior, impatience when questions are asked, reliance on
ultimatums, rude or belittling comments, and an overt lack of respect towards
the patient. Furthermore, because of over-reliance or “over trust,” patients
might fail to seek relevant medical information, alternative treatment
possibilities, and second medical opinions.
Relying too much on trust could mean that patients fail to engage in
reasonable, responsible behaviors to monitor their health and to critique the
treatment options provided. These issues become more relevant in a biotechtransfer age, in which patient–physician conflicts of interest are more apparent
than ever before, and in which patients believe that there is more to lose. These
conflicts might involve patient-data mining,112 a physician’s financial interest in
prescribing patients a certain treatment or drug,113 in patenting and profiting

109. It is, in part, emotional because it assumes that the trustee is “benevolent and caring.” Id.
110. It could also be argued that trust derived from fear of reprisal is really coerced trust and not
pure trust.
111. For example, the Hippocratic Oath instructs physicians to act selflessly and forthrightly in the
care and treatment of the patient. However, that oath is not one that emanates between the physician
and patient, but rather, from the patient’s perspective, is an external charge to doctors, the violation of
which affects their place within their profession, but does not build or restore a relationship with the
patient.
112. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (1990) (claiming doctors harvested
cells from a patient for lucrative medical research without patient consent).
113. Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical Research, 81
B.U. L. REV. 423, 424 (2001) (“[T]he boundaries separating medical research from clinical practice are
becoming increasingly hard to trace . . . . [S]ome drug and device manufacturers now compensate
primary care physicians for enrolling their patients in clinical studies.”).
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from cell lines or therapies derived from patients without their consent,114 or in
the conflicts inherent in some assisted-reproductive strategies115 and in plastic
surgeries.116
Conflicts may arise in any professional relationship. With physicians,
however, those conflicts can be more damaging because, unlike financial losses,
the harms can be very difficult to mitigate. In the physician–patient relationship,
patients invest by disrobing physically and emotionally, providing deeply
confidential information often unshared with family and friends. As the MUSC
prosecutions demonstrate, the fiduciary breaches in these contexts are not only
harmful to patients, but more devastating than in other situations.117 In the
MUSC cases, fiduciary breaches resulted in pregnant women giving birth while
their legs were shackled, and in some being transported to prison while still
bleeding from after birth.
Furthermore, when medical trust is violated, as arguably occurred in the
MUSC cases, few if any viable recourses exist for victims. In the worst cases,
unlike other fiduciary relationships, the criminal law is rarely involved to
address the “public breach” aspect of physician malfeasance even when
significant harms, including death, result.118 Why should investor fraud be
treated as a public breach and not medical fraud—such as deceptively luring
patients to engage in dangerous clinical trials or to submit to unnecessary, costly
medical procedures—when the consequences of medical fraud are much more
devastating? These questions are beyond the scope of this article. However, the
lack of criminal sanctions removes a significant deterrent to physician breaches
of trust. Hence, it is more important for patients to constantly and carefully
evaluate whether trust is deserved.
V
EVALUATING TRUST
Society is often disrupted by fiduciary breaches of trust. Recent scandals
involving Enron, Madoff, and Tyco provide an economic counterpart to
medical fraud. Defrauded investors and their advocates lament their losses and
114. Moore, 793 P.2d 479 (claiming doctors harvested cells from a patient for lucrative medical
research without patient consent); Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp.
2d 1064 (2003) (claiming doctors secretly patented a deadly gene derived from volunteer patient
research and then sought to enjoin any future research and treatment).
115. Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology & The Doublebind: the Illusory Choice
of Motherhood, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 3 (2005) (noting the inherent conflict between fetal
safety and making a profit in assisted reproductive procedures).
116. Rhonda Gay Hartmon, Face Value: Challenges of Transplant Technology, 31 AM. J. L. & MED.
7 (2005) (exploring issues related to facial transplants).
117. Upon learning that his doctor had surreptitiously mined his body for valuable cells, John
Moore stated that he felt “violated for dollars,” “invaded,” and “raped.” See LORI ANDREWS &
DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY
AGE 28 (1999).
118. See L. Song Richardson, When Human Experimentation Is Criminal, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 89 (2008).
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the betrayal of trust. Against the backdrop of those cases are pressing
questions: How preventable were the losses? To what extent was trust a factor
in the fiduciary breach? Was reliance on the fiduciary reasonable? These
questions are often unspoken. But if those defrauded were in the best position
to prevent their losses, how should tort law respond? Is strict liability the best
approach in fiduciary-breach scenarios, or would a comparative negligence
approach work better—holding clients, consumers, and patients accountable for
unreasonably relying on fraud or malpractice-prone fiduciaries?
History is replete with examples of medical wrongs that explain why it might
be reasonable for some groups to mistrust the profession.119 Implicit in that
observation is a normative question: Why should those harmed by their doctors
continue to trust without requiring the doctors to demonstrate care, concern,
commitment, and loyalty? Why should tort law provide a remedy for patients
without imposing some duty to mitigate?
Without patient trust, some scholars believe the “conceptual foundation of a
good and just physician–patient relationship would erode.”120 We do not argue
against trust in the physician–patient relationship. Rather, we urge that the trust
relationship be reconceptualized to read a patient-focused standard of
reasonableness into the trust relationship. Quality patient care should be the
focus of the physician–patient relationship, and achieving that objective may be
obscured by the notion that patients owe physicians blind trust.
Part IV builds from the prior section, judging victimhood and empowerment
on a conceptual scale. It articulates why a reframing of the trust dialogue in the
physician–patient context is necessary. In this section, we begin to articulate
what the more appropriate ex-post inquiries might be to determine reasonable
conduct. Here, we establish a test that considers consumer competence;
knowledge; prior experience; information availability; and resources to
investigate. Such a test, we argue, provides a more nuanced approach to
ascertain whether and in what instances it might be reasonable for a client or
patient to rely on a fiduciary.
A. Owed Trust
As a matter of first principles, this project explicitly acknowledges the value
of a healthy, well-functioning medical profession. The trust relationship is a
central component in determining how best to achieve that goal. But why
should patients owe physicians loyalty in the absence of demonstrated
competence, compassion, care, concern, and loyalty?
When patients believe that trust is owed to physicians and must be
surrendered without demonstration of loyalty, a hierarchy is reified in the
relationship that places the patient at the bottom of the vertical scale and
physicians at the top. The problems located within the hierarchy are the

119. See supra notes 21–87.
120. Gatter, supra note 97, at 1104.
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disempowerment of patients, creating instant victims, rather than active
participants in the patients’ own medical goals. Trust should be treated as an
option (to be strived for and earned) within the physician–patient relationship.
Rather than patients owing physicians trust, patients should realize
independent options. The physician–patient relationship can be judged on a
scale similar to personal relationships—such as those in a business, a contract,
or between friends and spouses—that involve choice, respect, expressions of
loyalty, demonstrable signs of care, concern, and commitment. In those
instances, trust is a value that must be earned, not one relinquished upon
demand or by coercion.
Normatively, it might not make sense for patients to always trust their
physicians, particularly when risks are high. In high-risk medical scenarios,
patients may have more to lose through physician malfeasance, and the relative
gains might not always be clear (particularly where conflicts arise). “The
willingness to take th[e] risk [to trust] turns on both the magnitude of the
perceived risk and the degree of harm that the truster will suffer if it turns out
that the trust was misplaced.”121
What changes in a reframing of trust? By reframing trust from an implicit
obligation on the part of patients to one that is shared with their physicians,
based upon a reasonable conclusion that trust is deserved, patients become
empowered in their ability to choose. The value of choice should not be
underestimated, for blind trust can lead to uninformed decision-making, lack of
empowerment, frustration, poor health outcomes, and litigation. Blind trust is
an irrational and unreasonable option for the patient. When trust is reframed,
patients assume greater responsibility for their medical care, thereby shifting
from powerlessness to sharing some fault (possibly) in preventable, poor
medical choices.
B. Reasonableness: The Patient Negligence Test
A modified trust framework could achieve a few important social goals. By
realigning trust, patients would become better healthcare consumers, likely to
be better informed about their choices in medical care, including their selection
of doctors. They would also understand the importance of asking questions
about the type of care they receive, engage in independent research, scrutinize
medical opinions, seek second and third options, and be more discerning in
reading the signs of loyalty. Importantly, reframing trust and creating better
consumers of patients will inure benefits to doctors as well as patients.
Better-informed patients are likely to seek out doctors who share similar
values, concerns, and acceptable styles of interaction. One significant problem
in the physician–patient relationship may be the inability to effectively
communicate. A patient who no longer feels obligated to expend trust and
invest in a relationship plagued with poor communication will likely seek a
121. Hill, supra note 2, at 1752.
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doctor with a better bedside manner. In this way, patient and physician styles of
interaction might better align to forge healthier relationships that are defined
by choice rather than by obligation. As a corollary, doctors are less likely to feel
guilty, stressed, and obligated to serve patients whom they feel less comfortable
about treating.
Splicing reasonableness into a trust framework holds many potential
benefits for patients and physicians. But how should reasonableness be
determined? Should it be an objective standard or one subjective to the
patient? A subjective standard would view the level of reasonableness from the
perspective of each individual patient, requiring an inquiry into the frame of
mind of each during the period leading up to fiduciary breach. An objective
standard would give less deference to the internal psychology of individual
patients and base reasonableness on community standards, akin to the test for
reasonable care in a medical malpractice suit.122 In most medical malpractice
cases, the standard of care is the fundamental issue to be established by the
plaintiff. The critical question centers on what standard is to be applied, namely
what is the community standard for the particular medical treatment in
question. The answers are generally derived locally, except where there is
conflict between a well-established national protocol and that of doctors in the
local community.
In this case, the standard should be an objective one, taking the perspective
of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position. The reason for this standard is
that the very nature of this proposal urges patients to be more invested in their
medical decision-making. At first glance, such a standard might appear to
disserve the most vulnerable patients such as Paula Hale, whose use of the
MUSC medical facility was based on a seeming lack of options, as she was
indigent, pregnant, and addicted to drugs.123 However, by judging
reasonableness from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
situation, the Patient Negligence Test (PNT), which we propose, considers the
spectrum of patient options and abilities. Under the PNT, there are five patientfocused factors for courts to consider: competence, knowledge, prior
experience, access to information, and resources to investigate. The PNT
provides a more nuanced approach to ascertain whether, and in what instances,
it might be reasonable for a client or patient to rely on a fiduciary. This
standard would apply to tort litigation in which patients are seeking remedies
for physician malfeasance. In all cases, patient negligence should be capped at
ten percent of the harm’s value.
By incorporating a reasonableness test that considers our five factors, courts
would be more likely to make sound decisions as to how reasonable it was for a
patient to have followed a physician-prescribed protocol that was detrimental to
122. Cairelli v. Vakilian, 80 Fed. Appx. 979 (2003) (finding that a doctor could not be held liable in
a suit brought by decedent’s estate when his actions were consistent within a community standard of
medical treatment).
123. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 1677.
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her health or that affected a legal right. And unlike traditional tort law, a
patient of limited mental competence would not be comparatively liable for
failure to make astute choices regarding her physician. Equally, a patient who
lacked financial options to make alternative choices or who was limited by
geography to seek alternative medical care might reasonably have trusted a
physician who was otherwise not ideal. On the other hand, a competent, wellinformed, and educated patient, with access to good information, might be
comparatively negligent in medical-malfeasance scenarios when it would have
been unreasonable to opt for medical treatment from a physician who had
already committed malpractice.
There are limits to this approach that we acknowledge. Equally, there are
questions that deserve a more thorough vetting than is provided for in this
thought experiment. For example, an empirical study would corroborate or
contradict the assumption pushed in most medial law scholarship that patient
trust is presumptive; that it leads to better outcomes (for patients and
physicians); and that it inspires physicians to provide better care to patients.
Indeed, an empirical study analyzing whether the specter of the law (and its
ability to provide remedies for patients and punish wrongdoers) equally
motivates or satisfies patients’ concerns about seeking medical help would
benefit the literature in this domain.
To this end, qualitative data analyzing patients’ attitudes on trust will help
to illuminate what really transpires between physicians and patients.
Particularly, African Americans should be participants in such a study. Because
of the historical use of African Americans as vulnerable rather than informed
research subjects, and ongoing contemporary health disparities, we predict that
African Americans will articulate a different version of what transpires between
physicians and patients. For some African Americans, it may not be trust in
operation that inspires their interaction with doctors, but rather reliance, and
there is a distinction.
As well, absent implementation of the model test promoted in this project,
we will not know whether such a rubric provides greater equilibrium in the
physician–patient relationship, and fosters greater equity, efficiency, and
efficacy. Finally, some might question whether the concept of patient negligence
would erode what is already a fragile relationship between some local hospitals
and the communities they serve.
In this project, we provide answers to questions based on case studies,
medical legacy, intuition, and reasoned assumptions. And while no data exists
to contradict our conclusions, there are other concerns that we must
acknowledge. Since this article is a preliminary thought experiment, we do not
attempt to offer more than a narrow framework here. This framework,
however, provides a new, clearer lens through which one might begin to
evaluate patient conduct as part of the larger physician–patient relationship.
Evaluating patient conduct does not impose a punitive standard, but rather
reconceptualizes patient autonomy and choice, thereby equalizing the
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physician–patient relationship, reordering the vertical nature of the
relationship, and reframing trust as an owed value to one that is rightfully
earned.
VI
CONCLUSION
Patients trust in doctors based largely on what they do not know. “Because
most patients are not able to treat themselves or to direct the medical treatment
they receive from another, they turn their care over to the discretion and skill of
a physician, laying their bodies and lives open to the physician.”124 In this space
of vulnerability, patients are typically expected to give up reason as a feature of
their exposure, susceptibility, and defenselessness. In other words, patients are
not expected to advocate for themselves, and, as a result, they do not seek to
empower themselves by becoming better-informed, better-prepared, or by
making better choices—if they make any choices at all. At the backend of this,
medical malpractice is used to rectify physician mistakes, even those that might
have been predictable and preventable. We argue that too much trust might
impose a heavy burden on patients and facilitate compliance with physician
negligence.
Behind the veil of trust are assumptions untenable for contemporary
medicine. In an era rife with conflicts of interest involving pharmaceutical
companies, clinical trials, patient mining, and high-cost non-therapeutic
surgeries, patients should be wary about blind trust and loyalty. Indeed, medical
practitioners should desire that patients become better informed about
treatment plans and options.
Thus, this article rejects the notion that trusting patients are better served
patients; medical malpractice cases demonstrate the perversity of that logic. Nor
does this article attempt to displace patient trust. We recognize trust as an
important philosophical, legal, and ethical aspect of the physician–patient
relationship: misaligned trust hurts patients’ interests. Yet misaligned trust
might go undetected if patients fear their medical options will be limited or that
they will be denied a high quality of care because of a failure to trust.
Introducing comparative fault and reasonableness into the physician–patient
trust framework dispels the notion that trust is a fixed concept. Perceiving trust
as something patients owe to physicians disables patients and reifies a vertical,
hierarchical patient–physician relationship. This power imbalance can lead
patients to believe that trusting a physician is something they should or must do,
rather than a choice to be bestowed upon a demonstration of merit. By turning
the trust dialogue and framework on its head, we hope to disentangle what
patients feel they must or should do from what they can do upon physicians’
demonstrating care, concern, commitment, competence, and loyalty. The
Patient Negligence Test for reasonableness in trust scenarios is an objective
124. Gatter, supra note 97, at 1099.
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standard, which will inform patients as well as courts. It considers competence,
knowledge, prior experience, access to information, and resources to investigate
as important criteria to evaluate the reasonableness of trust or patient
negligence.

